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Abstract
We consider a sequential setting in which a single dataset of individuals is used to perform adaptively-
chosen analyses, while ensuring that the differential privacy loss of each participant does not exceed a
pre-specified privacy budget. The standard approach to this problem relies on bounding a worst-case
estimate of the privacy loss over all individuals and all possible values of their data, for every single
analysis. Yet, in many scenarios this approach is overly conservative, especially for “typical” data points
which incur little privacy loss by participation in most of the analyses. In this work, we give a method
for tighter privacy loss accounting based on the value of a personalized privacy loss estimate for each
individual in each analysis. The accounting method relies on a new composition theorem for Rényi
differential privacy, which allows adaptively-chosen privacy parameters. We apply our results to the
analysis of noisy gradient descent and show how existing algorithms can be generalized to incorporate
individual privacy accounting and thus achieve a better privacy-utility tradeoff.
1 Introduction
Understanding how privacy of an individual degrades as the number of analyses using their data grows
is of paramount importance in privacy-preserving data analysis. On one hand, this allows individuals
to participate in multiple disjoint statistical analyses, all the while knowing that their privacy cannot
be compromised by aggregating the resulting reports. On the other hand, this feature is crucial for
privacy-preserving algorithm design — instead of having to reason about the privacy properties of a
complex algorithm, it allows reasoning about the privacy of the subroutines that make up the final
algorithm.
For differential privacy [11], this accounting of privacy losses is typically done using composition
theorems. Importantly, given that statistical analyses often rely on the outputs of previous analyses, and
that algorithmic subroutines feed into one another, the composition theorems need to be adaptive, namely,
allow the choice of which algorithm to run next to depend on the outputs of all previous computations.
For example, in gradient descent, the computation of the gradient depends on the value of the current
iterate, which itself is the output of the previous steps of the algorithm.
Given the central role that adaptive composition theorems play for differentially private data analysis,
they have been investigated in numerous works (e.g. [14, 22, 9, 26, 25, 3, 28, 5, 29]). While they differ in
some aspects, they also share one limitation. Namely, all of these theorems reason about the worst-case
privacy loss for each constituent algorithm in the composition. Here, “worst-case” refers to the worst
choice of individual in the dataset and worst choice of value for their data. This pessimistic accounting
implies that every algorithm is summarized via a single privacy parameter, shared among all participants
in the analysis.
In most scenarios, however, different individuals have different effects on each of the algorithms,
as measured by differential privacy. More precisely, the output of an analysis may have little to no
dependence on the presence of some individuals. For example, if we wish to report the average income
in a neighborhood, removing an individual whose income is close to the average has virtually no impact
on the final report after noise addition. Similarly, when training a machine learning model via gradient
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descent, the norm of the gradient of the loss function defined by a data point is often much smaller
than the maximum norm (typically determined by a clipping operation). As a result, in many cases no
single individual is likely to have the worst-case effect on all the steps of the analysis. This means that
accounting based on existing composition theorems may be unnecessarily conservative.
In this work, we present a tighter analysis of privacy loss composition by computing the associated
divergences at an individual level. In particular, to achieve a pre-specified privacy budget, we keep track
of a personalized estimate of the divergence for each individual in the analyzed dataset, and ensure that
the respective estimate for all individuals is maintained under the budget throughout the composition.
Additionally, even when there is no a priori budget on privacy, we design algorithms that provide a valid
running upper bound on the privacy loss for each individual in the dataset.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section, we give an overview of
our main results and discuss related work. In the next section, we introduce the preliminaries necessary
to state our results, and give an illustration of the benefits of individual privacy accounting in the
setting of non-adaptive composition. In Section 3, we prove our main adaptive composition theorem for
Rényi differential privacy. We build off this result in Section 4 and Section 5, where we develop Rényi
privacy filters and odometers — objects for budgeting and tracking privacy loss — and apply them to
individual privacy accounting. In Section 6 we present an application of our theory to differentially
private optimization, as well as some experimental results.
1.1 Overview of main results
It is straightforward to measure the worst-case effect of a specific data point on a given analysis in terms
of any of the divergences used to define differential privacy. One can simply replace the supremum over
all datasets in the standard definition of (removal) differential privacy with the supremum over datasets
that include that specific data point (see Def. 2.4). Indeed, such a definition was given in the work of
Ebadi et al. [17] and a related definition is given by Wang [30]. However, a meaningful application of
adaptive composition with such a definition immediately runs into the following technical challenge.
Standard adaptive composition theorems require that the privacy parameter of each step be fixed in
advance. For individual privacy parameters, this approach requires using the worst-case value of the
individual privacy loss over all the possible analyses at a given step. Individual privacy parameters tend
to be much more sensitive to the analysis being performed than worst-case privacy losses, and thus using
the worst-case value over all analyses is likely to negate the benefits of using individual privacy losses in
the first place.
Thus the main technical challenge in analyzing composition of individual privacy losses is that they
are themselves random variables that depend on the outputs of all the previous computations. More
specifically, if we denote by a1, . . . , at−1 the output of the first t − 1 adaptively composed algorithms
A1, . . . ,At−1, then the individual privacy loss of any point incurred by applying algorithm At is a
function of a1, . . . , at−1.Therefore, to tackle the problem of composing individual privacy losses we need
to understand composition with adaptively-chosen privacy parameters in general. We refer to this kind of
composition as fully adaptive.
The setting of fully adaptive privacy composition is rather subtle and even defining privacy in terms
of the adaptively-chosen privacy parameters requires some care. This setting was first studied by Rogers
et al. [28] who introduced the notion of a privacy filter. Informally, a privacy filter is a stopping time rule
that halts a computation based on the adaptive sequence of privacy parameters and ensures that a pre-
specified privacy budget is not exceeded. Rogers et al. define a filter for approximate differential privacy
that asymptotically behaves like the advanced composition theorem [14], but is substantially more
involved and loses a constant factor. Moreover, several of the tighter analyses of Gaussian noise addition
require composition to be done in Rényi differential privacy [1, 25]. Converting them to (ε,δ)-differential
privacy would incur an additional
√
log(1/δ) factor in the final bound.
Our main result can be seen as a privacy filter for Rényi differential privacy (RDP) whose stopping
rule exactly matches the rate of standard RDP composition [25].
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Theorem 1.1. Fix any B > 0,α > 1. Suppose that At is (α,ρt)-Rényi differentially private, where ρt is an
arbitrary function of a1, . . . , at−1. If
∑k
t=1ρt 6 B holds almost surely, then the adaptive composition ofA1, . . . ,Ak
is (α,B)-Rényi differentially private.
This theorem implies that stopping the algorithm based on the sum of privacy parameters so far is
valid even under fully adaptive composition. Note that, when all privacy parameters are fixed, Theorem
1.1 recovers the usual composition result for RDP [25]. Our RDP filter immediately implies a simple
filter for approximate differential privacy that is as tight as any version of the advanced composition
theorem obtained via concentrated differential privacy [3] (see Thm. 4.5). These Rényi-divergence-based
composition analyses are known to improve upon the rate of Dwork et al. [14] and, in particular, improve
on the results in [28].
Rogers et al. [28] also define a privacy odometer, which provides an upper bound on the running
privacy loss, and does not require a pre-specified budget. We show that simply adding up Rényi privacy
parameters does not make for a valid odometer for RDP, however by applying a discretization argument,
we construct an approximate odometer using our Rényi privacy filter.
We instantiate our general results for fully adaptive composition in the setting of individual privacy
accounting. This allows us to define an individual privacy filter, which, given a fixed privacy budget,
adaptively drops points from the analysis once their personalized privacy loss estimate exceeds the budget.
Therefore, instead of keeping track of a single running privacy loss estimate for all individuals, we track
a less conservative, personalized estimate for each individual in the dataset. Individual privacy filtering
allows for better, adaptive utilization of data points for a given budget, which we also demonstrate in
experiments.
1.2 Related work
The main motivation behind our work is obtaining tighter privacy accounting methods through, broadly
speaking, “personalized” accounting of privacy losses. Existing literature in differential privacy discusses
several related notions [20, 17, 30, 4], although typically with an incomparable objective. Ghosh and
Roth [20] discuss individual privacy in the context of selling privacy at auction and their definition does
not depend on the value of the data point but only on its index in the dataset. Cummings and Durfee
[4] rely on a similar privacy definition, investigate an associated definition of individual sensitivity, and
demonstrate a general way to preprocess an arbitrary function of a dataset into a function that has the
desired bounds on individual sensitivities.
Ebadi et al. [17] introduce personalized differential privacy in the context of private database queries
and describe a system which drops points when their personalized privacy loss exceeds a budget. In their
system personalized privacy losses result from record selection operations applied to the database. While
this type of accounting is similar to ours in spirit, their work only considers basic and non-adaptive
composition. The work of Wang [30] considers the privacy loss of a specific data point relative to a
fixed dataset. It provides techniques for evaluating this “per-instance” privacy loss for several statistical
problems. Wang [30] also briefly discusses adaptive composition of per-instance differential privacy as a
straightforward generalization of the usual advanced composition theorem [14], but the per-instance
privacy parameters are assumed to be fixed. As discussed above, having fixed per-instance privacy
parameters, while allowing adaptive composition, is likely to negate some of the benefits of personalized
privacy estimates. The work of Ligett et al. [24] tightens individuals’ personalized privacy loss by
taking into account subsets of analyses in which an individual does not participate. Within the studies
in which an individual participates, however, they consider the usual worst-case privacy loss, rather
than an individual one. In addition, the analyses in which the user participates are determined in a
data-independent way.
Our work can be seen as related to data-dependent approaches to analysis of privacy-preserving
algorithms such as smooth sensitivity [27], the propose-test-release framework [7], and ex-post privacy
guarantees [31]. The focus of our work is complementary in that we aim to capture the dependence of
the output on the value of each individual’s data point as opposed to the “easiness" of the entire dataset.
Our approach also requires composition to exploit the gains from individual privacy loss accounting.
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Finally, adaptive composition of differentially private algorithms is one of the key tools for establishing
statistical validity of an adaptively-chosen sequence of statistical analyses [16, 15, 2]. In this context,
Feldman and Steinke [19] show that the individual KL-divergence losses (or RDP losses for α = 1)
compose adaptively and can be exploited for deriving tighter generalization results. However, their
results still require that the average of individual KL-divergences be upper bounded by a fixed worst-case
value and the analysis appears to be limited to the α = 1 case.
2 Preliminaries
We will denote by S = (X1, . . . ,Xn) the analyzed dataset, and by S−i
def= (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn) the
analyzed dataset after removing point Xi . We will generally focus on algorithms that can take as input a
dataset or arbitrary size. If, instead, the algorithm requires an input of fixed size, one can obtain the same
results for algorithms that replace Xi with an arbitrary element X? fixed in advance (for example 0).
We start by reviewing some preliminaries on differential privacy.
Definition 2.1 ([11, 10]). A randomized algorithm A is (ε,δ)-differentially private (DP) if for all datasets
S = (X1, . . . ,Xn),
Pr [A(S) ∈ E] 6 eεPr
[
A(S−i) ∈ E
]
+ δ, and Pr
[
A(S−i) ∈ E
]
6 eεPr [A(S) ∈ E] + δ,
for all i ∈ [n] and all measurable sets E.
The technical portion of our analysis will make use of Rényi differential privacy (RDP), a relaxation
of DP based on Rényi divergences which often leads to tighter privacy bounds than analyzing DP directly.
Formally, the Rényi divergence of order α ∈ (1,∞) between two measures µ and ν such that µ ν is
defined as:
Dα(µ‖ν) = 1α − 1 log
∫ (
dµ
dν
)α
dν.
The Rényi divergence of order α = 1 is defined by continuity, and recovers the Kullback-Leibler (KL)
divergence. Relying on a standard abuse of notation, for two random variables X and Y , we will use
Dα(X‖Y ) to denote the Rényi divergence between their distributions.
Similarly as in Definition 2.1, to argue that an algorithm is Rényi differentially private, we will need to
bound bothDα(A(S)‖A(S−i)) andDα(A(S−i)‖A(S)), for all i ∈ [n]. For this reason, we introduce shorthand
notation for the maximum of the two directions of Rényi divergence:
D↔α (X‖Y ) def= max {Dα(X‖Y ),Dα(Y ‖X)} .
Definition 2.2 ([25]). A randomized algorithm A is (α,ρ)-Rényi differentially private (RDP) if for all
datasets S = (X1, . . . ,Xn),
D↔α
(
A(S)‖A(S−i)
)
6 ρ,
for all i ∈ [n].
Rényi differential privacy implies differential privacy; therefore, although our guarantees will be
stated in terms of RDP, the conversion to DP is immediate.
Fact 2.3 ([25]). If algorithm A is (α,ρ)-RDP, then it is also
(
ρ+ log(1/δ)α−1 ,δ
)
-DP, for any δ ∈ (0,1).
One of the successes of differential privacy (and RDP as well) lies in its adaptive composition property.
In Algorithm 1 we define adaptive composition, which is at the center of our analysis.
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Algorithm 1 Adaptive composition A(k)
input : dataset S ∈ X n, sequence of algorithms At , t = 1,2, . . . , k
for t = 1, . . . , k do
Compute at =At(a1, . . . , at−1,S)
end
Return A(k)(S) = (a1, . . . , ak)
If At(a1, . . . , at−1, ·) is (α,ρt)-RDP for all values of a1, . . . , at−1, then the standard adaptive composition
theorem for RDP says thatA(k) is (α,∑kt=1ρt)-RDP [25]. Note that, by definition, the parameters (ρ1, . . . ,ρk)
are independent of the specific a1, . . . , at−1 obtained in the adaptive computation. In other words, they
are fixed in advance.
2.1 Individual privacy losses
Our individual accounting relies on measuring the maximum possible effect of an individual data point
on a dataset statistic in terms of Rényi divergence. This measure is equivalent to an RDP version of
personalized differential privacy [17]. For convenience we will refer to it as individual Rényi differential
privacy, or individual RDP for short. We note, however, that, by itself, a bound on this divergence does
not imply any formal privacy guarantee for the individual. In particular, an individual RDP parameter
itself depends on the sensitive value of the data point.
Definition 2.4 (Individual RDP). Fix n ∈N and data point X. We say that a randomized algorithm A
satisfies (α,ρ)-individual Rényi differential privacy for X if for all datasets S ⊇ X such that |S | 6 n, it holds
that
D↔α (A(S)‖A(S \X)) 6 ρ.
Therefore, to satisfy the standard definition of RDP, an algorithm needs to satisfy individual RDP for
all data points X.
Our main focus will be on individual privacy losses as introduced in Definition 2.4, however some of
our results also hold under a weaker notion of individual privacy loss, which measures the effect of a
data point on the output of a statistical analysis, relative to a fixed dataset. This notion is an RDP version
of per-instance differential privacy [30].
Definition 2.5 (Individual RDP (per-instance)). Fix a dataset S = (X1, . . . ,Xn). We say that a randomized
algorithm A satisfies (α,ρ)-individual Rényi differential privacy for (S,Xi) if it holds that
D↔α
(
A(S)‖A(S−i)
)
6 ρ.
We will note which results hold under Definition 2.5, in addition to being valid under Definition 2.4.
Before we turn to analyzing composition, we give a simple example of individual RDP computation.
Example 2.6 (Linear queries). Let S = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ X n. Suppose that A is a d-dimensional linear query
with Gaussian noise addition, A(S) = ∑j∈[n]φ(Xj ) + ξ, for some φ : X →Rd and ξ ∼N (0,σ2Id). Then, A
satisfies α,D↔α
N
∑
j∈[n]
φ(Xj ),σ
2Id

∥∥∥∥∥∥ N
 ∑
j∈[n],j,i
φ(Xj ),σ
2Id


 =
(
α,
α‖φ(Xi)‖22
2σ2
)
individual RDP for Xi . Note that in this case individual RDP (Definition 2.4) and per-instance RDP
(Definition 2.5) have the same value.
The analysis above extends to arbitrary Lipschitz functions.
Example 2.7 (Lipschitz analyses). Suppose that g : (Rd)n → Rd′ is Li-Lipschitz in coordinate i. For
φ : X → Rd , let A(S) = g(φ(X1), . . . ,φ(Xn)) + ξ, ξ ∼ N (0,σ2Id′ ). Assume that for some X? , φ(X?) is the
origin. Then, by using X? to replace a removed element (namely S−i = (X1, . . . ,Xi−1,X? ,Xi+1, . . . ,Xn)), we
get that A satisfies
(
α,
αL2i ‖φ(Xi )‖22
2σ2
)
individual RDP for Xi .
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In the previous examples we focus on Gaussian noise for simplicity. Similar computations can be
carried out for other randomization mechanisms.
The main high-level idea behind our approach in tightening the composition analysis is to keep track
of the individual privacy losses for all samples Xi ∈ S at every round of privacy composition. Before we
delve into the analysis of adaptive composition through the lens of individual privacy, we first consider a
simpler setting, where all computations are non-adaptively-chosen.
2.2 Warm-up: tighter non-adaptive composition via individual privacy
To illustrate the gains of using individual privacy, we first consider non-adaptive composition, where the
computation at time t has no dependence on the past reports; that is, At(a1, . . . , at−1,S) ≡ At(S).
For simplicity, suppose that we sequentially receive bounded queries q1,q2, . . . , where qt : X → [0,1]
for all t ∈N, and we want to report their sum over a dataset S = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ X n subject to the constraint
that the output needs to be (α,B)-RDP, for some pre-specified budget B. A prototypical mechanism
for answering such queries is the Gaussian mechanism, which reports at =
∑n
i=1 qt(Xi) + ξt , where
ξt ∼N (0,σ2). This mechanism satisfies (α,ρ(i)t ) individual RDP for Xi , where
ρ
(i)
t =D
↔
α
N
∑
j∈[n]
qt(Xj ),σ
2
 , N
 ∑
j∈[n],j,i
qt(Xj ),σ
2

 = αqt(Xi)22σ2 .
In contrast, the worst-case differential privacy parameters are (α,ρt) =
(
α, α2σ2
)
.
Given the constraint of the overall report being (α,B)-Rényi differentially private, classical analyses
— which only consider ρt — would suggest answering at most k0 = b2Bσ2α c queries via the Gaussian
mechanism, in order to ensure privacy.
By using individual privacy, we can ensure the same privacy guarantees while achieving a potentially
higher utility in terms of the number of answered queries. Indeed, the number of queries that can be
answered accurately is determined by the queries evaluated on the analyzed data.
Proposition 2.8. For all t ∈N, let St =
(
Xi ∈ S : ∑tj=1 qj (Xi)2 6 2Bσ2α ) , and let at = ∑Xi∈St qt(Xi) + ξt , where
ξt ∼N (0,σ2). Then, the sequence of reports a1, a2, . . . is (α,B)-Rényi differentially private. Moreover, for all t
such that
∑t
j=1 qj (Xi)
2 6 2Bσ
2
α ∀i, it holds that |at −
∑
Xi∈S qt(Xi)| 6
√
2log(1/δ)σ with probability at least 1−δ.
Here, St denotes the set of “active” points at time t. Note that, due to ρ
(i)
t 6 ρt , all points are active for
at least the first k0 computations, as prescribed by the usual worst-case analysis. Therefore, individual
privacy provides a more fine-grained way of quantifying privacy loss by taking into account the value
of the point whose loss we aim to measure. Naturally, after a certain number of reports we expect few
points to remain active, and hence one needs to decide on a stopping criterion for the reports. We discuss
stopping criteria in more detail later on.
To give an example application of Proposition 2.8, in the context of continual monitoring [13, 18],
a platform might collect one real-valued indicator per user per day, and wish to make decisions based
off the daily averages of these indicators across users. Here, Xi would be a single user, and qt(Xi) = X
(i)
t
would be the corresponding user’s indicator on day t. Assuming Gaussian noise addition, Proposition 2.8
suggests that the platform can utilize the data of each user in a privacy-preserving manner as long as
the squared `2-norm of their indicators is not too large. This implication of Proposition 2.8 is especially
important in applications where the collected values are naturally sparse; for example, if the collected
values are binary indicators X(i)t ∈ {0,1} of a change of state. While a classical approach to privacy would
allow a total number of reports proportional to the privacy budget, an individual privacy approach
allows making a number of reports proportional to the number of positive reports, that is
∑t
j=1X
(i)
j , for
all individuals i.
Proposition 2.8 is easy to prove using standard techniques, by considering the `2-sensitivity of the
entire output of the algorithm. This result also holds for more general analyses (with ρ(i)t used in place of
6
αqj (Xi )2
2σ2 in the computation of the “active" dataset St) and the proof follows directly from known properties
of composition in RDP. In our main result we argue that the same result holds when composition is
adaptive.
3 Fully adaptive composition for Rényi differential privacy
Our main technical contribution is a new adaptive composition theorem for Rényi differential privacy,
which bounds the overall privacy loss in terms of the individual privacy losses of all data points. As
argued earlier, the main challenge in understanding how individual privacy parameters compose is the
fact that these parameters are random, rather than fixed. In what follows, we first state a general version
of our main theorem, which bounds the privacy loss in adaptive composition in terms of a bound on
the sequence of possibly random privacy parameters. Then, we instantiate this result in the context of
individual privacy.
We set up some notation within the context of adaptive composition (Algorithm 1). We denote by
a(t)
def= (a1, . . . , at) the sequence of the first t reports, and by A(t)(·) def= (A1(·),A2(A1(·), ·), . . . ,At(A1(·), . . . , ·))
the composed algorithm which produces a(t). For two datasets S and S ′, parameter α > 1 and fixed a(t),
we let1
Loss(t)(a(t);S,S ′ ,α) def=
 Pr
[
A(t)(S) = a(t)
]
Pr
[
A(t)(S ′) = a(t)
] 
α
.
Similarly, for fixed a(t) we also define
Losst(a
(t);S,S ′ ,α) def=
(
Pr [At(a1, . . . , at−1,S) = at]
Pr [At(a1, . . . , at−1,S ′) = at]
)α
.
Roughly speaking, Loss(t) denotes the total privacy loss incurred by the first t rounds of adaptive
composition, while Losst denotes the loss incurred in round t (which, due to adaptivity, depends on the
outcomes of the first t − 1 rounds).
Generally, we will be interested in Losst(a(t);S,S ′ ,α) and Loss(t)(a(t);S,S ′ ,α) when a(t) is output by
adaptive composition; in such cases, these two quantities are random.
Note that, since
Pr
[
A(t)(S) = a(t)
]
= Pr
[
A(t−1)(S) = a(t−1)
]
Pr
[
At(A1(S), . . . ,At−1(A1(S), . . . ),S) = at | A(t−1)(S) = a(t−1)
]
= Pr
[
A(t−1)(S) = a(t−1)
]
Pr [At(a1, a2, . . . , at−1,S) = at] ,
we have Loss(t)(a(t);S,S ′ ,α) = Loss(t−1)(a(t−1);S,S ′ ,α) ·Losst(a(t);S,S ′ ,α).
We let ρt denote the RDP parameter of order α of At , conditional on the past reports. For the sake of
generality and simplicity of exposition, we introduce an abstract space S over pairs of datasets and let
ρt =
1
α − 1 log sup(S,S ′)∈S
E
a(t)∼A(t)(S ′)
[
Losst(a
(t);S,S ′ ,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)] . (1)
In the context of individual privacy (Definition 2.4), we will instantiate S to be the space of all dataset
pairs where either dataset is obtained by deleting Xi from the other. For the per-instance notion
(Definition 2.5), we will set S =
{
(S,S−i), (S−i ,S)
}
. In the context of usual RDP, S will be the space of all
pairs of datasets that differ in the presence of one element.
The classical composition theorem for Rényi differential privacy — while allowing At to depend
on the previous reports — constrains At to be (α,ρt)-RDP for some fixed ρt . Here, we make no such
constraints on ρt ; hence, ρt will in general be a random variable, due to the randomness in a1, . . . , at−1.
1All algorithms we will be considering in this paper, if not discrete, induce a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure. For
such instances, replacing expressions such as Pr
[
A(t)(S) = a
]
with the density of A(t)(S) at a gives the analysis in the continuous
case.
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Theorem 3.1 states that, as long as
∑k
t=1ρt is maintained under a fixed budget, the output of adaptive
composition preserves privacy.
Theorem 3.1. Fix any B > 0,α > 1, and a set of pairs of datasets S . If ∑kt=1ρt 6 B holds almost surely, then
the adaptive composition A(k) satisfies
Dα
(
A(k)(S)‖A(k)(S ′)
)
6 B,
for all (S,S ′) ∈ S .
Proof. Fix any (S,S ′) ∈ S . In what follows, we take a(t) = (a1, . . . , at) to be distributed as the random
output of adaptive composition applied to S ′, that is a(t) ∼ A(t)(S ′). Consequently, Loss(t)(a(t);S,S ′ ,α)
and Losst(a(t);S,S ′ ,α) are also random.
Let Mt
def= Loss(t)(a(t);S,S ′ ,α)e−(α−1)
∑t
j=1 ρj , and let M0 = 1. Consider the filtration Ft = σ (a(t)). We
prove that Mt is a supermartingale with respect to Ft ; that is, we show E[Mt | Ft−1] 6Mt−1. This follows
since:
E[Mt | Ft−1] = E
Loss(t)(a(t);S,S ′ ,α) e−(α−1)∑tj=1 ρj ∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ft−1

= E
Loss(t−1)(a(t−1);S,S ′ ,α) Losst(a(t);S,S ′ ,α) e−(α−1)∑tj=1 ρj ∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ft−1

= Loss(t−1)(a(t−1);S,S ′ ,α) e−(α−1)
∑t
j=1 ρj E
Losst(a(t);S,S ′ ,α) ∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ft−1

6 Loss(t−1)(a(t−1);S,S ′ ,α) e−(α−1)
∑t
j=1 ρj e(α−1)ρt
= Loss(t−1)(a(t−1);S,S ′ ,α) e−(α−1)
∑t−1
j=1 ρj
=Mt−1,
where the third equality uses the fact that (ρj )
t
j=1 ∈ Ft−1, and the inequality applies the definition of ρt .
Therefore, by applying iterated expectations, we can conclude
E[Mk] = E
a(k)∼A(k)(S ′)
[
Loss(k)
(
a(k);S,S ′ ,α
)
e−(α−1)
∑k
j=1 ρj
]
6 E[M0] = 1.
Since
∑k
j=1ρj 6 B by assumption, this inequality implies
E
a(k)∼A(k)(S ′)
[
Loss(k)
(
a(k);S,S ′ ,α
)]
6 e(α−1)B.
After normalizing, we get
Dα
(
A(k)(S),A(k)(S ′)
)
=
1
α − 1 log Ea(k)∼A(k)(S ′)
[
Loss(k)
(
a(k);S,S ′ ,α
)]
6 B.
Since the choice of (S,S ′) was arbitrary, we can conclude sup(S,S ′)∈S Dα
(
A(k)(S),A(k)(S ′)
)
6 B, as desired.

We now instantiate Theorem 3.1 in the context of individual privacy.
We use ρ(i)t to denote the individual privacy parameter of the t-th adaptively composed algorithm At
with respect to Xi , conditional on the past reports. More formally, for fixed α > 1 and for any data point
Xi ∈ S we let:
ρ
(i)
t
def=
1
α − 1 log supS⊇Xi :|S |6n
max
 Ea(t)∼A(t)(S−i )
[
Losst(a
(t);S,S−i ,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)] , E
a(t)∼A(t)(S)
[
Losst(a
(t);S−i ,S,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)]
 .
(2)
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Since ρ(i)t is an instance of the general definition (1) obtained by specifying S , a direct corollary of
Theorem 3.1 is as follows.
Corollary 3.2. Fix any B > 0. If for any input dataset S = (X1, . . . ,Xn),
∑k
t=1ρ
(i)
t 6 B holds almost surely for
all individuals i ∈ [n], then the adaptive composition A(k) is (α,B)-Rényi differentially private.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1,
∑k
t=1ρ
(i)
t 6 B implies that
D↔α
(
A(k)(S)‖A(k)(S−i)
)
6 B.
Since this holds for all i ∈ [n], we conclude that A(k) is (α,B)-Rényi differentially private. 
Notice that
∑k
t=1ρ
(i)
t 6 B is a data-specific requirement, while classical composition results consider all
hypothetical datasets. In Subsection 4.1 we will show how Corollary 3.2 can be operationalized.
It is worth mentioning that Corollary 3.2 also holds under the per-instance notion of individual
privacy (Definition 2.5). This result is obtained by simply taking S = {(S,S−i), (S−i ,S)} in the proof, where
S is the analyzed dataset. However, our main application of Corollary 3.2 — individual privacy filtering,
stated in the following section — requires individual privacy loss accounting according to Definition 2.4.
4 Rényi privacy filter
Rogers et al. [28] define the notion of a privacy filter, an object that takes as input adaptively-chosen DP
parameters ε1,δ1, . . . , εt ,δt , as well as a global differential privacy budget εg ,δg , and outputs CONT if
the overall report after t rounds of adaptive composition with the corresponding privacy parameters is
guaranteed to satisfy (εg ,δg )-DP. Otherwise, it outputs HALT.
By an immediate extension of Theorem 3.1, we show that a valid RDP version of a privacy filter
simply adds up privacy parameters, as in the usual composition where all privacy parameters are fixed
up front. By existing conversions of RDP guarantees to DP guarantees, we recover a filter for DP as well,
thus improving upon the rate obtained by Rogers et al.
As in equation (1), we let ρt denote the possibly random RDP parameter of order α of At , conditional
on the past reports. We again assume an implicit space S over pairs of datasets, which we instantiate in
different ways depending on the privacy accounting method.
Algorithm 2 Adaptive composition with Rényi privacy filtering
input : dataset S ∈ X n, maximum number of rounds N ∈N, sequence of algorithms Ak , k = 1,2, . . . ,N
Initialize k = 0
Compute ρ1 =
1
α−1 log sup(S,S ′)∈S Ea(1)∼A(1)(S ′)
[
Loss1(a(1);S,S ′ ,α)
]
while Fα,B (ρ1, . . . ,ρk+1) = CONT and k < N do
k← k + 1
Compute ak =Ak(a1, . . . , ak−1,S)
Compute ρk+1 =
1
α−1 log sup(S,S ′)∈S Ea(k+1)∼A(k+1)(S ′)
[
Lossk+1(a(k+1);S,S ′ ,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(k)]
end
Return A(k)(S) = (a1, . . . , ak)
Let S∞ denote the set of all positive, real-valued finite sequences.
Definition 4.1 (RDP filter). Fix a parameter α > 1, and privacy budget B. We say that Fα,B : S∞ →
{CONT,HALT} is a valid Rényi privacy filter, or RDP filter for short, if for any sequence of algorithms
(Ak)Nk=1, Algorithm 2 satisfies
D↔α
(
A(k)(S)‖A(k)(S−i)
)
6 B,
for all datasets S = (X1, . . . ,Xn) and i ∈ [n].
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We make a remark about the use of privacy filters. The analyst might choose an algorithm at time
t that exceeds the privacy budget, which will trigger the filter Fα,B to halt. However, the analyst can
then decide to change the computation at time t retroactively and query the filter again, which then
might allow continuation. This way, one can ensure a sequence of N computations with formal privacy
guarantees, for any target number of rounds N . In the following subsection, we present an application of
RDP filters to individual privacy loss accounting which relies on this reasoning.
Theorem 4.2. Let
Fα,B(ρ1, . . . ,ρk) =
CONT, if
∑k
t=1ρt 6 B,
HALT, if
∑k
t=1ρt > B.
Then, Fα,B is a valid Rényi privacy filter.
Proof. The only difference between Theorem 3.1 and this theorem is that a privacy filter halts at a
random round, meaning the length of the output is random rather than fixed. Therefore, in this proof we
formalize the fact that Theorem 3.1 is valid even under adaptive stopping.
Fix any (S,S ′) ∈ S . By the argument in Theorem 3.1, Mt def= Loss(t)(a(t);S,S ′ ,α)e−(α−1)
∑t
j=1 ρj , where
a(t) ∼ A(t)(S ′), is a supermartingale with respect to Ft = σ (a(t)).
Let T be the time when Algorithm 2 halts; that is,
T = min
{
t : Fα,B(ρ1, . . . ,ρt+1) = HALT}∧N.
Note that T is a stopping time with respect to Ft , that is {T = t} ∈ Ft , due to the fact that ρt+1 ∈ Ft .
Since T is almost surely bounded by construction, we can apply the optional stopping theorem for
supermartingales to get
E[MT ] = E
a(T )∼A(T )(S ′)
[
Loss(T )
(
a(T );S,S ′ ,α
)
e−(α−1)
∑T
j=1 ρj
]
6 E[M0] = 1.
By definition of the RDP filter, we know that
∑T
j=1ρj 6 B almost surely; otherwise the filter would have
halted earlier. Thus, we can conclude
E
a(T )∼A(T )(S ′)
[
Loss(T )
(
a(T );S,S ′ ,α
)
e−(α−1)B
]
6 1.
After rearranging and normalizing, this implies
Dα
(
A(T )(S),A(T )(S ′)
)
=
1
α − 1 log Ea(T )∼A(T )(S ′)
[
Loss(T )
(
a(T );S,S ′ ,α
)]
6 B.
Therefore, Fα,B is a valid RDP filter. 
We remark that Rogers et al. define a privacy filter somewhat more generally, by treating the analyst
as an adversary who is allowed to pick “bad” neighboring datasets at every step (see Algorithm 2 in [28]).
Theorem 4.2 holds under this setting as well, however we opted for a simpler presentation.
Just like Corollary 3.2 applies Theorem 3.1 in the individual privacy setting, we can apply Rényi
privacy filters to individual RDP parameters, in which case the filter indicates whether the privacy loss
of a specific individual is potentially violated.
4.1 Individual privacy filter
Now we design an individual privacy filter, which monitors individual privacy loss estimates across all
individuals and all computations, and ensures that the privacy of all individuals is preserved. The filter
guarantees privacy by adaptively dropping data points once their cumulative individual privacy loss
estimate is about to cross a pre-specified budget. More specifically, at every step of adaptive composition
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t, it determines an active set of points St ⊆ S based on cumulative estimated individual losses, and applies
At only to St .
Algorithm 3 Adaptive composition with individual privacy filtering
input : dataset S ∈ X n, sequence of algorithms At , t = 1,2, . . . , k
for t = 1, . . . , k do
For all Xi ∈ S, compute ρ(i)t (as in eq. (2))
Determine active set St =
(
Xi : Fα,B(ρ(i)1 , . . . ,ρ(i)t ) = CONT
)
For all Xi ∈ S, set ρ(i)t ← ρ(i)t 1{Xi ∈ St}
Compute at =At(a1, . . . , at−1,St)
end
Return (a1, . . . , ak)
Here, Fα,B is the Rényi privacy filter from Theorem 4.2. Given its validity, one can observe that
Algorithm 3 preserves Rényi differential privacy.
Theorem 4.3. Adaptive composition with individual privacy filtering (Algorithm 3) satisfies (α,B)-Rényi
differential privacy.
Proof. Denote by Afiltt the subroutine given by the t-th step of the individual filtering algorithm; that is,
at =Afiltt (a1, . . . , at−1,S). Note that Afiltt is not equal to At . By analogy with the notation A(t), we also let
Afilt(t)(·) def= (Afilt1 (·),Afilt2 (Afilt1 (·), ·), . . . ,Afiltt (Afilt1 (·), . . . , ·)).
We argue that the privacy loss of point Xi in round t, conditional on the past reports, is upper bounded
by ρ(i)t (after ρ
(i)
t has been updated):
1
α − 1 logmax
{
E
a(t)∼Afilt(t)(S−i )
[
Lossfiltt (a
(t);S,S−i ,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)] , E
a(t)∼Afilt(t)(S)
[
Lossfiltt (a
(t);S−i ,S,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)]} 6 ρ(i)t ,
(3)
where Lossfiltt (a
(t);S,S ′ ,α) =
(
Pr[Afiltt (a1,...,at−1,S)=at]
Pr[Afiltt (a1,...,at−1,S ′)=at]
)α
.
To do so, we reason about the active set of points at time t when the input to adaptive composition
is S, and when the input is S−i . Denote by St the active set given input S, and by S−it the active set
given input S−i . Observe that, conditional on a1, . . . , at−1, S−it = St \Xi . This follows because the sequence
(ρ(i)j )
t
j=1 is measurable with respect to a1, . . . , at−1, and whether point Xi is active at time t is in turn
determined based only on (ρ(i)j )
t
j=1. In particular, whether any given point is active does not depend on
the rest of the input dataset (S or S−i), given a1, . . . , at−1. Therefore, if Xi < St , then Xi loses no privacy in
round t, because Afiltt (a1, . . . , at−1,S) d=Afiltt (a1, . . . , at−1,S−i), conditional on a1, . . . , at−1. On the other hand,
if Xi ∈ St , then its privacy loss can be bounded as
1
α − 1 logmax
{
E
a(t)∼Afilt(t)(S−i )
[
Lossfiltt (a
(t);S,S−i ,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)] , E
a(t)∼Afilt(t)(S)
[
Lossfiltt (a
(t);S−i ,S,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)]}
6
1
α − 1 logmax
{
E
a(t)∼Afilt(t)(S−i )
[
Losst(a
(t);St ,S
−i
t ,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)] , E
a(t)∼Afilt(t)(S)
[
Lossfiltt (a
(t);S−it ,St ,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)]}
6
1
α − 1 log supS⊇Xi
max
{
E
a(t)∼A(t)(S−i )
[
Losst(a
(t);S,S−i ,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)] , E
a(t)∼A(t)(S)
[
Losst(a
(t);S−i ,S,α)
∣∣∣∣ a(t−1)]}
6 ρ(i)t .
With this, we have showed that ρ(i)t is a valid estimate of the privacy loss of Xi , for all i ∈ [n].
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Now we argue that, at the end of every round t (after ρ(i)t has been updated), Fα,B(ρ(i)1 , . . . ,ρ(i)t ) = CONT
for all i ∈ [n]. This follows by induction. For t = 1, this is clearly true because Fα,B(0) = CONT. Now
assume it is true at time t−1. Then, at time t, the filter clearly continues for all Xi ∈ St simply by definition
of St . If Xi < St , then Fα,B(ρ(i)1 , . . . ,ρ(i)t ) = Fα,B(ρ(i)1 , . . . ,ρ(i)t−1,0) = Fα,B(ρ(i)1 , . . . ,ρ(i)t−1) = CONT. Therefore, we
conclude that at the end of every round t ∈ [k] and all i ∈ [n], the filter would output CONT. By the
validity of Fα,B, we know that Fα,B(ρ(i)1 , . . . ,ρ(i)t ) = CONT implies
D↔α
(
A(t)(S)‖A(t)(S−i)
)
6 B,
and since this holds for all S and all i ∈ [n], we conclude that Algorithm 3 is (α,B)-RDP. 
We can now justify the use of a supremum over all datasets that include X in Definition 2.4 and,
in particular, why the per-instance notion in Definition 2.5 does not suffice. By the current design of
Algorithm 3, Xi < St implies no privacy loss for point Xi . This is true because, conditional on a1, . . . , at−1,
Xi being inactive ensures that St would be the same regardless of whether the input to Algorithm 3 is
S or S−i . Consequently, the output at time t would be insensitive to the value of Xi . Under the more
fine-grained definition of individual privacy, even if Xi < St , its privacy could still leak at round t. The
reason is that, under two different inputs S and S−i , the running privacy loss estimates for all points are
different, and hence the active set St in the two hypothetical scenarios could be different as well. This
fact, in turn, implies two different distributions over reports at . In short, dropping Xi from the analysis
does not prevent its further privacy leakage if accounting is done according to Definition 2.5.
In Section 6, we apply the individual privacy filter to differentially private optimization via gradient
descent, and demonstrate how this object ensures utilization of data points as long as their realized
gradients have low norm.
4.2 (ε,δ)-differential privacy filter via Rényi filter
By connections between Rényi differential privacy and approximate differential privacy [3, 25], we can
translate our Rényi privacy filter into a filter for approximate differential privacy.
We define a valid DP filter analogously to a valid RDP filter, the difference being that it takes as input
DP, rather than RDP parameters, and that it is parameterized by a global DP budget εg > 0,δg ∈ (0,1). We
denote by εt the possibly adaptive differential privacy parameter of At :
εt = sup
(S,S ′)∈S
sup
E
Pr
[
At(a1, . . . , at−1,S) ∈ E | a(t−1)
]
Pr
[
At(a1, . . . , at−1,S ′) ∈ E | a(t−1)
] .
We focus on advanced composition of pure differentially private algorithmsAt . As shown in [28], a DP
filter for approximately differentially private algorithms At can be obtained by an immediate extension
of a filter for pure DP algorithms.
Algorithm 4 Adaptive composition with differential privacy filtering
input : dataset S ∈ X n, maximum number of rounds N ∈N, sequence of algorithms Ak , k = 1,2, . . . ,N
Initialize k = 0
while Gεg ,δg (ε1, . . . , εk+1) = CONT and k < N do
k← k + 1
Compute ak =Ak(a1, . . . , ak−1,S)
end
Return A(k)(S) = (a1, . . . , ak)
As before, S∞ denotes the set of all positive, real-valued finite sequences.
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Definition 4.4 (DP filter). Fix εg > 0,δg ∈ (0,1). We say that Gεg ,δg : S∞ → {CONT,HALT} is a valid
differential privacy filter, or DP filter for short, if for any sequence of algorithms (Ak)Nk=1, Algorithm 4
satisfies
Pr
[
A(k)(S) ∈ E
]
6 eεg Pr
[
A(k)(S−i) ∈ E
]
+ δg , Pr
[
A(k)(S−i) ∈ E
]
6 eεg Pr
[
A(k)(S) ∈ E
]
+ δg ,
for all datasets S = (X1, . . . ,Xn), i ∈ [n], and measurable events E.
We note that Rogers et al. [28] define a differential privacy filter somewhat differently — for example,
in their definition a filter admits a sequence of privacy parameters of fixed length — however Definition
4.4 is essentially equivalent to theirs.
By invoking standard conversions between DP and Rényi-divergence-based privacy notions, our
analysis implies a simple stopping condition for a DP filter, in terms of any zero-concentrated differ-
ential privacy (zCDP) level which ensures (εg ,δg )-DP. For clarity, we give one particularly simple such
translation from zCDP to DP, however one could in principle invoke more sophisticated analyses such as
those of Bun and Steinke [3]. In general, we can reproduce any rate for advanced composition of DP that
utilizes Rényi-divergence-based privacy definitions, in the setting of fully adaptive composition.
Theorem 4.5. Let B? be the largest B > 0 such that B-zero-concentrated differential privacy (zCDP) implies
(εg ,δg )-differential privacy. Let
Gεg ,δg (ε1, . . . , εk) =
CONT, if 12
∑k
t=1 ε
2
t 6 B
? ,
HALT, if 12
∑k
t=1 ε
2
t > B
? .
Then, Gεg ,δg is a valid DP filter. For example,
Gεg ,δg (ε1, . . . , εk) =

CONT, if 12
∑k
t=1 ε
2
t 6
(
−
√
log(1/δg ) +
√
log(1/δg ) + εg
)2
,
HALT, if 12
∑k
t=1 ε
2
t >
(
−
√
log(1/δg ) +
√
log(1/δg ) + εg
)2
is a valid DP filter.
Proof. By conversions between DP and zCDP [3], we know that εt-DP implies 12ε
2
t -zCDP, that is (α,
1
2ε
2
t α)-
RDP, for all α > 1. Thus, a Rényi filter with parameters (α,αB?) would stop once 12
∑k
t=1 ε
2
t > B
? . Since
this condition is independent of α, the output of adaptive composition with this stopping condition
satisfies (α,B?)-RDP for all α > 1. This guarantee is equivalent to B?-zCDP, and by assumption this
implies (εg ,δg )-DP as well.
By Fact 2.3, B?-zCDP implies
(
minααB
? +
log(1/δg )
α−1 ,δg
)
-DP. Optimizing over α and solving for B? such
that minααB? +
log(1/δg )
α−1 = εg yields B? =
(
−
√
log(1/δg ) +
√
log(1/δg ) + εg
)2
. 
If the privacy parameters are fixed up front and εt ≡ ε, simplifying the stopping criterion of the above
DP filter implies that adaptive composition of k ε-differentially private algorithm satisfies(1
2
kε2 +
√
2k log(1/δ)ε,δ
)
-differential privacy,
for all δ > 0. This tightens the rate of Rogers et al. [28]. While reading off the exact rate is difficult,
since the smallest εg for which the filter continues cannot be easily expressed, their rate is greater than(
1
2kε(e
ε − 1) +√2k log(1/δ)ε,δ) by a significant constant factor. Further improvements on the rate are
possible via a more intricate conversion between RDP (or, rather, zCDP) and DP, as presented in [3].
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5 Rényi privacy odometer
A privacy filter is meant to estimate whether the realized privacy loss surpassed a fixed threshold. As
such, it is meant to shape the course of adaptive composition by limiting the privacy loss. A privacy
odometer [28], on the other hand, is a more sophisticated object meant to give a valid upper bound on the
privacy loss incurred thus far, typically without constraining the analyses.
First we discuss privacy odometers in the general context of random privacy parameters, and then we
apply this general theory toward designing an individual privacy odometer.
Formalizing what it means to have a valid odometer is a delicate task. Perhaps the most natural
requirement for an odometer Ot would be for the following condition to hold true almost surely, for all
rounds t ∈N, datasets S ∈ X n, and its elements i ∈ [n]:
1
α − 1 max
{
log E
a(t)∼A(t)(S−i )
[
Loss(t)(a(t);S,S−i ,α)
∣∣∣∣ Ot] , log E
a(t)∼A(t)(S)
[
Loss(t)(a(t);S−i ,S,α)
∣∣∣∣ Ot]} 6Ot . (4)
Given the validity of a privacy filter which simply adds up RDP parameters, it seems reasonable to have
an odometer which adds up RDP parameters as well. However, if we set Ot =
∑t
j=1ρj , it is not hard to see
that condition (4) does not hold.
Example 5.1. Suppose we run two algorithms A1 and A2, which take as input a single bit S ∈ {0,1}. Let
ρ1
def=
1
α − 1 log Ea1∼A(1)(1)
[Loss1(a1;0,1,α)] , ρ2
def=
1
α − 1 log Ea(2)∼A(2)(1)
[
Loss2((a1, a2);0,1,α)
∣∣∣∣ a1] .
Suppose that A1 outputs non-negative reals, and that we pick A2 such that ρ2 = a1. Then,
E
a(2)∼A(2)(1)
[
Loss(2)(a(2);0,1,α)
∣∣∣∣ ρ1 + ρ2] = E
a(2)∼A(2)(1)
[
Loss1(a1;0,1,α) ·Loss2((a1, a2);0,1,α)
∣∣∣∣ ρ2]
= E
a(2)∼A(2)(1)
[
Loss1(a1;0,1,α) ·Loss2((a1, a2);0,1,α)
∣∣∣∣ a1]
= Loss1(a1;0,1,α) E
a(2)∼A(2)(1)
[
Loss2((a1, a2);0,1,α)
∣∣∣∣ a1]
= Loss1(a1;0,1,α)e
(α−1)ρ2 .
SinceEa1∼A(1)(1) [Loss1(a1;0,1,α)] = e
(α−1)ρ1 , the right-hand is guaranteed to be at most e(α−1)(ρ1+ρ2) almost
surely only if Loss1(a1;0,1,α) ≡ ELoss1(a1;0,1,α), and this happens only when ρ1 = 0.
5.1 Approximate privacy odometer via privacy filtering
The previous example illustrates how constructing a valid RDP odometer might be non-trivial. However,
we make an observation that a valid Rényi privacy filter can be utilized to design an approximate
odometer as follows.
We let ρt denote the RDP parameter of order α of At , conditional on the past reports — as per
equation (1).
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Algorithm 5 Tracking privacy loss via Rényi privacy odometer
input : dataset S ∈ X n, discretization error ∆ > 0, sequence of algorithms At , t = 1,2, . . . , k
Initialize odometer O1 = ∆
Set Trestart = 1
for t = 1,2, . . . , k do
Compute at =At(a1, . . . , at−1,S)
if Fα,∆(ρTrestart , . . . ,ρt) = HALT then
Augment odometer Ot←Ot−1 +∆
Update restart time Trestart← t
else
Ot←Ot−1
end
end
In words, every time an RDP filter with privacy budget ∆ halts, we restart a new filter and augment
the odometer by ∆. Here, ∆ > 0 is the discretization error of the odometer.
An important question here is how one should go about choosing ∆. If ∆ is large, then the odometer is
very coarse and inaccurate. On the other end, if ∆ is small, the filter might halt very often, and whenever
a filter halts we effectively make the upper bound on the odometer a bit looser. Roughly speaking, if we
restart at time t we lose a factor of ∆−∑t−1j=Trestart ρj , where Trestart is the last restart time before t.
We now state the guarantees of our Rényi privacy odometer. For all j ∈N, let Tj denote the j-th time
a filter restarts in Algorithm 5. More formally, we can define the sequence {Tj }j recursively as
Tj = min
{
t > Tj−1 : Fα,∆(ρTj−1 , . . . ,ρt) = HALT
}
, where T0 = 0.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that ρj 6 ∆ almost surely, for all j ∈N, and let t be any time such that Tk−1 6 t < Tk .
Then, the odometer Ot in Algorithm 5 upper bounds the privacy loss at time t:
sup
(S,S ′)∈S
Dα
(
A(t)(S)‖A(t)(S ′)
)
6 k∆ =Ot , ∀i ∈ [n].
Proof. Since the output (a1, . . . , at) is a post-processing of (a1, . . . , aTk−1), it suffices to prove that the latter
output satisfies (α,k∆)-RDP. The algorithm A(Tk−1) can be written as an adaptive composition of k
algorithms, each of which outputs (aTj−1 , . . . , aTj−1), j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Therefore, by the standard adaptive
composition theorem for RDP, it suffices to argue that each of these k algorithms is RDP, conditional on
the outputs of the previous algorithms. Since Fα,∆ is a valid Rényi privacy filter by Theorem 4.2, each of
these k algorithms is indeed (α,∆)-RDP, which completes the proof. 
5.2 Individual privacy odometer
In the context of individual privacy, Proposition 5.2 allows designing a personalized privacy odometer
for all analyzed data points. Here, we track O(i)t for all points Xi ∈ S. The update is analogous to that
of Algorithm 5, the difference being that a separate privacy filter is applied to the individual privacy
parameters for all points separately. Naturally, each data point has its own random times of filter
exceedances, {T (i)j }j . Formally, we define the sequence {T (i)j }j recursively as
T
(i)
j = min
{
t > T
(i)
j−1 : Fα,∆
(
ρ
(i)
T
(i)
j−1
, . . . ,ρ
(i)
t
)
= HALT
}
, where T (i)0 = 0.
Here, ρ(i)t are individual privacy parameters, measured according to equation (2).
15
Algorithm 6 Individual privacy loss tracking via Rényi privacy odometer
input : dataset S ∈ X n, discretization error ∆ > 0, sequence of algorithms At , t = 1,2, . . . , k
For all i ∈ [n], initialize odometer O(i)1 = ∆ and set T (i)restart = 1
for t = 1,2, . . . , k do
Compute at =At(a1, . . . , at−1,S)
for i = 1, . . . ,n do
if Fα,∆(ρ(i)
T
(i)
restart
, . . . ,ρ
(i)
t ) = HALT then
Augment odometer O(i)t ←O(i)t−1 +∆
Update restart time T (i)restart← t
else
O
(i)
t ←O(i)t−1
end
end
end
It is worth pointing out that odometer values O(i)t are sensitive, as they depend on the value of the
data point Xi . Importantly, they can be disclosed to the respective user without violating the other
users’ privacy; O(i)t depends on Xi , but it does not depend on the other data points (other than through
a1, . . . , at−1, which are reported in a privacy-preserving manner).
Below we state an immediate corollary of Proposition 5.2.
Corollary 5.3. Suppose that ρ(i)j 6 ∆ almost surely, for all j ∈N and i ∈ [n]. For fixed i ∈ [n], let t be any time
such that T (i)k−1 6 t < T
(i)
k . Then, the odometer O
(i)
t in Algorithm 6 upper bounds the individual privacy loss of
point Xi at time t:
D↔α
(
A(t)(S)‖A(t)(S−i)
)
6 k∆ =O(i)t .
It is worth pointing out that the same odometer validity guarantee would hold if accounting was
done according to the per-instance notion of individual privacy (Definition 2.5). In that case, however,
odometer values O(i)t would depend on the whole dataset S, and not just Xi . Consequently, reporting the
odometers to users — without violating other users’ privacy — would require greater care.
6 Private gradient descent with individual privacy accounting
In this section, we discuss an application of the individual privacy filter from Section 4 to differentially
private optimization. Within this application, we also demonstrate the use of Rényi privacy odometers
from Section 5.
A popular approach to differentially private model training via gradient descent is to clip the norm
of individual gradients at every time step and add Gaussian noise to the clipped gradients [1]. Existing
privacy analyses compute the overall privacy spent up to a given round by using a uniform upper bound
on the gradient norms, determined by the clipping value. Using the individual privacy filter from Section
4, we develop a less conservative version of private gradient descent, one which takes into account the
realized norms of the gradients, rather than just their upper bound.
There are various natural ways one could incorporate individual privacy accounting into the standard
private gradient descent (GD) algorithm [1]. To facilitate the comparison, we present a particularly
simple one. As in private gradient descent, at every step we clip all computed gradients and add Gaussian
noise. However, after the round at which private gradient descent would halt, we additionally look at
the "leftover" privacy budget for all points, and utilize them until their budget runs out. The leftover
budget for each point is essentially equivalent to the difference between the worst-case sum of squared
`2-norms of the gradients (determined by the clipping value) and the sum of squared `2-norms of the
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realized gradients. Below we provide the details of this application and also contrast it with the standard
private gradient descent algorithm.
Algorithm 7 Private gradient descent
input : dataset (X1, . . . ,Xn), loss function `(θ;Xi),
learning rate (ηt)∞t=1, noise scale σ > 0, clip
value C > 0, number of steps k ∈N
Initialize θ1 arbitrarily
for t = 1,2, . . . , k do
Compute gradients gt(Xi)←∇θ`(θt ;Xi),∀i
Clip g¯t(Xi)← gt(Xi) ·min
(
1, C‖gt(Xi )‖2
)
,∀i
Add noise g˜t← 1n
∑n
i=1(g¯t(Xi) +N (0,σ
2C2I))
Take gradient step θt+1← θt − ηt g˜t
end
Return θk+1
Algorithm 8 Private gradient descent with filtering
input : dataset (X1, . . . ,Xn), loss function `(θ;Xi),
learning rate (ηt)∞t=1, noise scale σ > 0, clip
value C > 0, number of steps kmax ∈ N,
squared norm budget Bnorm > 0
Initialize θ1 arbitrarily
for t = 1,2, . . . , kmax do
Compute gradients gt(Xi)←∇θ`(θt ;Xi),∀i
Clip g¯t(Xi)←
gt(Xi) ·min
1, min
(
C,
√
Bnorm−∑t−1j=1 ‖g¯j (Xi )‖22)
‖gt(Xi )‖2
 ,∀i
Add noise g˜t← 1n
∑n
i=1(g¯t(Xi) +N (0,σ
2C2I))
Take gradient step θt+1← θt − ηt g˜t
end
Return θk+1
In Algorithm 7, all gradients get clipped to have norm at most C at every time step. In Algorithm 8,
the gradient for point Xi gets clipped to have norm at most min(C,Bnorm −∑t−1j=1 ‖g¯j(Xi)‖22). This means
that, at least for the first bBnorm/C2c rounds, all gradients get clipped to have norm at most C. After round
bBnorm/C2c, points adaptively get filtered out once the accumulated squared norm of their (clipped)
gradients reaches Bnorm. Therefore, we observe that for Bnorm = kC2 and kmax = k, Algorithm 8 recovers
Algorithm 7.
The standard privacy guarantees of Algorithm 7 are given as follows.
Proposition 6.1. Private gradient descent (Algorithm 7) satisfies
(
α, αk2σ2
)
-RDP, for all α > 1.
We prove the privacy guarantees of Algorithm 8 as a corollary of our individual privacy filter.
Proposition 6.2. Private gradient descent with filtering (Algorithm 8) satisfies
(
α, αBnorm2σ2C2
)
-RDP, for all α > 1.
Proof. By properties of the Gaussian mechanism, the individual RDP parameters of order α are ρ(i)t =
α‖g¯t(Xi )‖22
2σ2 . Therefore, by properties of the individual filter, as long as
α
∑t
j=1 ‖g¯j (Xi )‖22
2σ2 6 B, the output is
(α,B)-individually RDP with respect to Xi . The clipping step ensures this inequality holds with B =
αBnorm
2σ2
for all t ∈N and for all data points Xi , and therefore the algorithm is
(
α, αBnorm2σ2
)
-RDP. 
When Bnorm = kC2, the privacy guarantees of Algorithm 8 are the same as those of Algorithm 7.
However, they do not depend on the total number of steps kmax — in particular, kmax need not be equal
to k. A natural question here is how to set the number of rounds kmax in Algorithm 8. (Certainly kmax
should be at least bBnorm/C2c, otherwise the privacy budget is not used up for any data point.) If kmax
is relatively small, we might stop the optimization process too early, and thus forgo the possibility of
achieving a higher accuracy. If, on the other hand, we set kmax to be too large, then a lot of points might
get filtered out, in which case we add high amounts of noise relative to the number of active points.
One solution is to periodically estimate the number of active points in a privacy-preserving fashion. In
particular, after round bBnorm/C2c, the analyst can estimate the size of the active set {i : ∑tj=1 ‖g¯j (Xi)‖22 6
Bnorm} (which is just a linear query) and use it to stop the computation. To reduce the privacy cost of such
estimates one can use the continual monitoring technique [13] since each point is filtered out only once.
Alternatively, if one only wants to ensure that the size of the active set exceeds some fixed threshold, one
can use the sparse vector technique [12, 8] and thus incur an even smaller privacy loss due to adaptive
stopping.
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We also remark that, in practice, it is more common to use private SGD, rather than batch gradient
descent. However, with individual privacy accounting, random subsampling of points would require
computing gradients for all points at every step anyway (given that there is positive probability of every
point participating at any step). As a result, running SGD would be no less computationally expensive.
Nevertheless, gradient descent requires fewer steps and we observe that it achieves a better privacy-utility
tradeoff, so it should be the preferred choice whenever computationally feasible.
We compare the performance of private gradient descent (Algorithm 7) and its generalization with
filtering (Algorithm 8) in two settings; one, in which we train a non-convex deep learning model on
MNIST [23], and another where we train a logistic regression classifier on the Adult dataset [6]. All
reported average accuracies and deviations are estimated over 10 trials. In both cases, we fix target
differential privacy parameters (ε,δ), and evaluate the test accuracy. We set δ = 10−5, and vary the value
of ε. For every ε, all algorithm hyperparameters are first tuned to achieve high test accuracy with private
gradient descent. For private gradient descent with filtering, to make the comparison as clear as possible,
we adopt the same hyperparameters. In addition, we tune kmax on a separate and independent set of runs
of our experiments.
6.1 Experiments on MNIST
We train a convolutional neural network with the same architecture as in the MNIST example of the
Pytorch DP library: https://github.com/facebookresearch/pytorch-dp. Since we run batch gradient
descent and not SGD, we tune all hyperparameters from scratch. We observe that private gradient descent
achieves a better privacy-accuracy tradeoff than existing SGD baselines.
For small ε, we observe that private gradient descent with filtering, with carefully chosen number of
steps kmax > Bnorm/C2, achieves a noticeably higher accuracy than private GD with the same learning
rate, noise scale, clip value, and k = Bnorm/C2. Below we summarize the achieved test accuracies.
MNIST accuracies
ε Private gradient descent Private gradient descent with filtering
0.3 (92.80± 0.52)% (93.18± 0.32)%
0.5 (94.62± 0.43)% (94.90± 0.26)%
1.2 (96.56± 0.15)% (96.56± 0.15)%
For ε = 0.3, we set σ = 170, C = 10, ηt ≡ η = 0.2, and k = 104 for private GD without filtering.
To achieve the same privacy guarantees using private GD with individual filtering, we set Bnorm =
kC2 = 10400, and we increase the total number of steps by 20%, i.e. kmax = 125 ≈ 1.2k. Given these
parameters, private GD achieves test accuracy of (92.80±0.52)%, while private GD with filtering achieves
(93.18± 0.32)%.
For ε = 0.5, we set σ = 130, C = 15, ηt ≡ η = 0.15, and k = 180 for private GD without filtering. For
GD with individual filtering, we set Bnorm = kC2 = 40500, and we increase the total number of steps by
10%, i.e. kmax = 1.1k = 198. Given these parameters, private GD achieves test accuracy of (94.62±0.43)%,
while private GD with filtering achieves (94.90± 0.26)%.
For ε = 1.2, we set σ = 88, C = 10, ηt ≡ η = 0.25, and k = 460 for private GD without filtering. This
parameter configuration achieves accuracy of (96.56 ± 0.15)%. When private GD achieves such high
accuracies, we observe little benefit to individual filtering. This is due to the fact that the proportion of
points filtered out right after round bBnorm/C2c is comparable to the proportion of points yet misclassified,
suggesting that few misclassified points remain in the active pool. Therefore, we set Bnorm = kC2 = 46000,
and kmax = k. Note that the accuracy achieved by private GD significantly exceeds the accuracy of (94.63±
0.34)%, previously reported for roughly the same ε (1.19), using the same architecture and private SGD
(https://github.com/facebookresearch/pytorch-dp/blob/master/examples/mnist_README.md).
For ε = 0.3, we implement a Rényi odometer and observe the histogram of privacy losses at different
training steps. Figure 2 shows the histogram of individual privacy odometers at step k/2 = 52, k = 104,
and kmax = 125. We set α = 63 (which approximately optimizes the conversion from RDP to DP via
Fact 2.3), and ∆ = 0.00109 ≈ α/σ2. Our experiment suggests that the individual privacy odometers give
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Figure 1: One run of private GD with filtering, for ε = 0.3 (left) and ε = 0.5 (right). For ε = 0.3, at step 104 (which
is when private GD terminates) the test accuracy is 92.28%, while at step 125 (which is when private GD with
filtering terminates) the test accuracy is 93.65%. For ε = 0.5, at step 180 (which is when private GD terminates) the
test accuracy is 94.90%, while at step 198 (which is when private GD with filtering terminates) the test accuracy is
95.11%.
a reasonably tight estimate of the privacy loss despite the discretization error — for example, in the
rightmost plot, we observe that the highest individual odometer values are around 0.135, and RDP loss
of 0.135 translates to ε ≈ 0.32, thus slightly overestimating ε = 0.3.
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Figure 2: Histogram of individual privacy odometers at step k/2 = 52 (left), k = 104 (middle), and kmax = 125 (right).
The parameters are set as for ε = 0.3, and α = 63,∆ = 0.00109.
6.2 Experiments on Adult
We perform additional evaluations in a convex setting, by training a logistic regression classifier on the
Adult dataset. This setting was also studied by Iyengar et al. [21], who report a non-private accuracy
baseline of 84.8%. The table below summarizes our results.
Adult accuracies
ε Private gradient descent Private gradient descent with filtering
0.3 (83.80± 0.22)% (83.91± 0.12)%
0.5 (84.11± 0.15)% (84.18± 0.10)%
1.0 (84.28± 0.11)% (84.42± 0.12)%
1.2 (84.45± 0.13)% (84.48± 0.15)%
For ε = 0.3, we set σ = 455.34, C = 3.70, ηt ≡ η = 1.5, and k = 800 for private GD without filtering. For
private GD with individual filtering, we set Bnorm = kC2, and we increase the total number of steps by
20%, i.e. kmax = 960 = 1.2k. Given these parameters, private GD achieves test accuracy of (83.80±0.22)%,
while private GD with filtering achieves (83.91± 0.12)%.
For ε = 0.5, we set σ = 433.80, C = 3.70, ηt ≡ η = 1.5, and k = 2000 for private GD without filtering.
For GD with individual filtering, we set Bnorm = kC2, and we increase the total number of steps by 5%,
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i.e. kmax = 1.05k = 2100. Given these parameters, private GD achieves test accuracy of (84.11± 0.15)%,
while private GD with filtering achieves (84.18± 0.10)%.
For ε = 1.0, we set σ = 613.49, C = 3.70, ηt ≡ η = 2, and k = 4000 for private GD without filtering. This
parameter configuration achieves accuracy of (84.28±0.11)%. For private GD with individual filtering,
we set Bnorm = kC2, and we increase the total number of steps by 20%, i.e. kmax = 1.2k = 4800. This
results in accuracy (84.42± 0.12)%.
For ε = 1.2, we set σ = 259.33, C = 3.70, ηt ≡ η = 2, and k = 4000 for private GD without filtering,
thus achieving accuracy of (84.45± 0.13)%. For private GD with individual filtering, we set Bnorm = kC2,
and we increase the total number of steps by 3%, i.e. kmax = 1.03k = 4120. This results in accuracy
(84.48± 0.15)%.
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